Interpreting the probabilities in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism by Neels, Gary
Interpreting the Probabilities in Plantinga’s




In this paper, I examine Plantinga’s (1993, 2000, 2011) Evolutionary Argu-
ment Against Naturalism (EAAN). While there has been much discussion
about Plantinga’s use of probabilities in the argument,1 I contend that in-
sufficient attention has been paid to the question of how we are to interpret
those probabilities. In this paper, I argue that views Plantinga defends else-
where limit the range of interpretations available to him here. The upshot
is that the EAAN is more limited in its applicability than Plantinga alleges.
1 The EAAN
The EAAN proceeds as follows:
1. P(R|N ∧ E) is low.
2. Anyone who believes (N ∧ E) and sees that P(R|N ∧ E) is low has a
defeater for R.
3. Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for all her beliefs,
including the belief in (N ∧ E).
*Forthcoming in The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion please cite final draft.
†Thanks to Chris Stephens, the students in his seminar “Evolution of Rationality” and
referees.
1See, for example, Fitelson & Sober (1998), Alston (2002), and Otte (2002).
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4. If one who believes (N ∧ E), thereby acquires a defeater for (N ∧ E),
(N ∧ E) is self-defeating and cannot be rationally accepted.
5. Conclusion: (N ∧ E) cannot be rationally accepted.2
Some explanation is in order: R refers to the proposition that our cog-
nitive faculties are reliable. That is, do they produce a preponderance of
true beliefs?3 Plantinga does not specify precisely what proportion of true
beliefs is sufficient for R to be true. With respect to memory, he says it would
need to be greater than two thirds (2011, p.323). However, a little later in
the chapter, he suggests that the proportion must be at least three quarters
in order for a cognitive faculty to be reliable (p.332-333). Precisification is
likely not the point here. Requiring inerrancy is too stringent, getting things
right only half the time is too lax, and perhaps that is all Plantinga means
to say here.
N is the claim that naturalism is true. Again, Plantinga does not mean to
give a fine-grained definition of naturalism. We can consider it a conjunction
that includes as a minimum that there is no such person as the God of
Traditional Theism (TT). E is the claim that contemporary evolutionary
theory gets things correct with respect to its description of how our cognitive
equipment came to be.
A defeater for a belief B is another belief B* such that once I believe B* I
can no longer rationally hold B. Suppose I believe that I would remember if I
ran around campus with no pants last night. However, you point out to me
that I drank an enormous amount of alcohol last night. If I believe you, I can
no longer rationally believe that I would remember if I ran around campus
with no pants last night. Drinking an enormous amount of alcohol would
compromise my ability to recall what happened during that time frame.
Plantinga’s contention is that (N ∧ E) is such that it provides a defeater for
itself, provided one recognizes that the conditional probability P(R|N ∧ E)
is low.
2This presentation is found in Plantinga’s most recent expression of the EAAN (2011,
p.344-345). I would note here that 5 doesn’t strictly follow from 1-4, since accepting (N ∧ E)
is not sufficient to acquire the defeater. One must also see that the conditional probability
mentioned in premise 1 is low.
3Plantinga seems to be concerned here with what Peter Godfrey-Smith calls “head-
world” reliability (1991, p.711). Head-world reliability is concerned with eliminating false
beliefs. It contrasts with world-head reliability, which is concerned with eliminating true
non-beliefs.
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Note that Plantinga does not hold that anyone needs an argument for the
belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable. On his account, it is fine to treat
our cognitive faculties as proverbially innocent until proven guilty. This is
sensible; once one begins to doubt the reliability of their cognitive faculties,
they are in a bad way, epistemically. The only means at their disposal
to overcome this doubt are their cognitive faculties, whose reliability is
precisely the object of this doubt. His contention is that believing (N∧E) puts
someone in a position where their cognitive faculties have been “proven
guilty” (in the sense that this person has a defeater for the belief that their
cognitive faculties are reliable).
2 Interpreting Plantinga’s Probabilities
By presenting his claim in explicitly probabilistic terms, Plantinga raises an
important question as to how we are to interpret probability in this context.
In addressing this question, he claims “we could think of this probability in
two ways: as a conditional epistemic probability, or as a conditional objective
probability. Either will serve for my argument, but I think the better way
to think of it would be as objective probability” (p.220, fn7). In Where the
Conflict Really Lies, he again expresses his preference for understanding this
claim in terms of objective probability: “The probability we are thinking of
here is objective, not the personalist’s subjective probability, and also not
epistemic probability” (2011, p.332).
It is not always clear what people mean when they speak of objec-
tive, subjective and epistemic probabilities.4 I take it that the distinction
between objective probabilities on the one hand and epistemic (and/or sub-
jective) probabilities on the other hand, is that objective probability is a
mind-independent notion. Epistemic probabilities, by contrast, are mind-
dependent in the sense that they reference a rational agent’s degrees of be-
lief. Examples of objective interpretations of probability include frequency
interpretations, propensity interpretations, and logical interpretations5 in-
4See (Gillies, 2000) and (Hájek, 2019) for extensive overviews and classifications of the
various interpretations of probability.
5As Plantinga notes (1993, p.144), logical interpretations actually have both objective
and epistemic aspects. On the one hand, they interpret probability as a mind-independent
relation of partial entailment that obtains between pairs of propositions. On the other hand,




Epistemic conceptions of probability interpret probabilities as the degree
to which a proposition is believed. Examples of subjective interpretations
of probability include the classical interpretation of Laplace and Pascal,
Williamson’s (2000) Objective Bayesian view ]6, and the standard (some-
times called “subjective” or “personalist”) Bayesian view. What these all
have in common is that they interpret probabilities as a degree of belief.
What separates them is the normative constraints they pose on rational de-
grees of belief. The standard Bayesian account is more permissive, allowing
a broad range of permissible probability distributions. Classical probability,
with its Principle of Indifference (PI), is more stringent. In his discussions
of epistemic probability, Plantinga eschews the permissive Bayesian view,
for the more stringent. Indeed, as we will see, he invokes the PI to defend
the first premise of the EAAN.
In what follows, I will argue that no Traditional Theist7 can interpret the
conditional probability referenced in his first premise as objective. Doing so
would be self-defeating, since (as I shall argue) those interpretations entail
the falsity of traditional theism. The upshot here is that traditional the-
ists must interpret the conditional probability referenced in Plantinga’s first
premise in terms of epistemic probabilities. Further, I argue that Plantinga’s
use of the principle of indifference in defending his first premise is at odds
with his Reformed Epistemology. The upshot here is that Plantinga’s de-
fence of premise 1 is at best incomplete.
2.1 Why Traditional Theists Can’t Interpret Premise 1 as Objec-
tive
In this section I argue that interpreting Plantinga’s first premise in terms of
objective probabilities entails the denial of TT. Recall that premise 1 claims
that a certain conditional probability, namely P(R|N ∧ E) is low. Note first,
that this claim entails that P(N) , 0.
6See footnote 15 for more on Williamson’s view.
7It is not entirely clear what Plantinga has in mind when he references TT. I will assume
that according to TT, God exists necessarily and eternally.
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Proof. First note that by Bayes’ Theorem:
P(R|N ∧ E) =
P(N ∧ E|R)P(R)
P(N ∧ E)
Now, suppose that P(N) = 0. It is a theorem of the probability calculus that
P(N∧E) cannot be greater than P(N). So, P(N∧E) = 0. In that case, since the
denominator on the right side of our equality is 0, P(R|N ∧ E) is undefined.
So, if P(N) = 0, then P(R|N∧E) is undefined. By contraposition, then, if this
conditional probability has a value (even if it is low, as Plantinga claims),
P(N) , 0. 
Central to Plantinga’s concern here is the question of the existence of
God. Recall that N was defined as a conjunction that included at a minimum
the claim that God does not exist. If P(N) , 0, then the probability that God
exists is less than 1.
Proof. Suppose P(N) > 0. Observe that (in Plantinga’s characterization of
naturalism) ¬G is a conjunct of N. Since P(N) > 0, and ¬G is a conjunct of
N, it follows that P(¬G) > 0. It is a theorem of the probability calculus that
P(G) = 1−P(¬G). From this it follows that P(G) < 1. Thus, if P(N) > 0, then
P(G) < 1. 
Now consider three common interpretations of probability that are ob-
jective (in the sense of being mind-independent described above). First,
objective probability can been understood in terms of frequencies. On this
view, probabilities are understood in terms of how often a particular out-
come obtains, relative to some set of alternatives. Note that the frequency
interpretation only references how often the outcome obtains in the actual
world. A commonly recognized problem here is that this view can’t make
sense of attaching probabilities to one-time events (think of a coin that is
flipped once and then immediately destroyed). In order to make sense of
probabilities of one-time events, one might turn to hypothetical frequencies
or propensities. Here, probability is not understood in terms of how often
an outcome actually obtains, but in terms of a tendency for the outcome to
obtain. It is a measure of how often the outcome would have obtained if
the trial had been repeated. Given the standard semantics for subjunctive
conditionals, we can think of the propensity view in terms of how often
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the outcome obtains in nearby possible worlds. A third interpretation of
objective probability that might be relevant here is Carnap’s logical inter-
pretation. On this interpretation, probability is understood in terms of the
proportion of logically possible worlds the outcome obtains. This propor-
tion is a function of the logical syntax of the description of the outcome in
question.
We have seen that Plantinga’s premise 1 entails that P(G) < 1. Now, let
us consider what that means on these interpretations of probability. First,
consider the frequency interpretation: if the probability of God’s existence
is less than 1, on this interpretation, this would amount to there being
times at which God does not actually exist. TT claims, though, that God is
eternal, existing from everlasting to everlasting. So, if we are talking about
frequencies in the actual world, TT entails that P(G) = 1. In other words,
Plantinga’s premise 1 entails the falsity of TT on this view.
Next, consider the logical interpretation. On this interpretation, the
probability of God’s existence represents the proportion of possible worlds
in which he exists. A common claim by traditional theists is that God
exists in all possible worlds. Indeed, Plantinga himself defends a modal
version of the ontological argument according to which the sentence “God
exists” is either necessarily true or necessarily false (Plantinga, 1974, p.213-
217). That is, its probability is either 1 or of 0 according to the logical
view of probability. According to TT, P(G) = 1 on this interpretation. Note
that on the standard account of subjunctive conditionals, this consequence
will also hold for the propensity view. On either the propensity or logical
interpretation, then, Plantinga’s premise 1 entails the falsity of TT.
While Plantinga formulates his argument in terms of standard prob-
ability theory, which derives conditional probability from unconditional
probability, one might be tempted to think he could salvage the argument
by using an alternative system.8 Karl Popper famously articulated a sys-
tem in which conditional probability is primitive (1959). Can Plantinga’s
premise 1 be salvaged from the problem I have described if it were formu-
lated using Popper functions? In short, no. To see why, note that it is an
axiom for Popper functions that if  ¬N and  T, then P(N|T) = 0.9 Letting
T stand for a tautology, TT is committed to both  ¬N and  T, and so TT
8Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.
9See Hawthorne (2016) for a complete axiomitization of Popper functions.
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is committed to P(N|T) = 0. As a result, Plantinga’s premise 1 entails the
falsity of TT, even when treated as a Popper function.
Proof. First, by an axiom of Popper functions, since N∧E is logically equiv-
alent to N ∧ E ∧ T, P(R|N ∧ E) = P(R|N ∧ E ∧ T). Further, by another axiom
of Popper functions:
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ T) =
P(R ∧ E ∧N|T)
P(E ∧N|T)
The denominator here, P(E ∧ N|T) = P(E|N ∧ T)P(N|T). But as I argued
above, on TT, P(N|T) = 0, and thus the denominator here is 0. So, just as
with standard probability, on Popper functions, the conditional probability
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ T) is undefined. Popper functions pose the same problem for
Plantinga’s premise 1 as do standard conditional probabilities. 





P(B) , when,P(B) > 0
1, when,P(B) = 0
While this work around could solve the problem of P(R|N ∧ E) being
undefined (by the lights of TT), it is of no help to Plantinga. He claims that
P(R|N ∧ E) is low, but on this approach it would be maximal, rendering
premise 1 false.
To sum up: if we interpret Plantinga’s premise 1 in terms of objective
probabilities, it entails the falsity of TT. This result obtains whether we use
standard probabilities (as Plantinga does) or Popper functions. So, despite
his claims to the contrary, I conclude that Plantinga is committed to an
epistemic interpretation of the probabilities in his EAAN. I turn now to
explicating the challenges Plantinga faces in defending his premise 1, given
that we need to interpret it in terms of subjective probabilities.
2.2 Difficulties in Interpreting Premise 1 as Epistemic
There are two problems for Plantinga if we interpret the probabilities as
epistemic. On the one hand, his argument does not work given the permis-
10See Hawthorn op cit. and van Fraassen (1995) for more details.
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siveness of the standard Bayesien view. On the other hand, the normative
constraint he leans on in defending his first premise, the PI, is at odds with
his Reformed Epistemology.
On the standard Bayesian view there are two normative constraint on
degrees of belief. The first is probabilistic coherence. That is, in order
to be rational, they must comport with the axioms of probability theory.
The second constraint dictates how one must update her credences, given
new information. This updating, since it is represented using conditional
probabilities, is often called conditionalization. Prior probabilities are rep-
resented using unconditional probabilities, and posterior probabilities are
represented using conditional probabilities. Consider some proposition P
you believe. And consider some new propositional evidence E that you
come to learn. P(P) represents your initial degree of belief in P. According
to the Bayesian, rationality requires that, once you come to learn E, your







In terms of an interpretation of probability, this is perhaps not so con-
troversial. Since its inception, probability theory has at least partly been
about reasonable degrees of belief.12 However, since this interpretation also
purports to answer epistemological questions, controversy looms. Many,
including Plantinga,13 hold that this view is too permissive, and are moti-
vated to pose further constraints on the prior probabilities.
Note that the standard Bayesian view is too permissive for Plantinga’s
EAAN to work. Consider the presentation of the argument in Warrant
and Proper Function (1993). In this presentation, Plantinga notes 5 different
possibilities with respect to the question of how actions and beliefs are
causally connected:
1. Beliefs are epiphenomenal.
2. Beliefs are not the cause of action, but the effects.
11For simplicity’s sake, I assume that E comes with complete firmness, that is when E is
learned, P(E) becomes 1. For a more nuanced version, see Jeffrey (1965).
12See Gillies (2000, p.18-22) and Hacking (2006, p.11-17).
13See chapters 8 and 9 of Warrant and Proper Function (Plantinga, 1993), for Plantinga’s
critique of the standard Bayesian view.
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3. Beliefs have causal efficacy, but not by virtue of their content.
4. Beliefs have causal efficacy, by virtue of content, but are maladaptive.
5. Beliefs have causal efficacy, by virtue of content, and are adaptive.
These possibilities are mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive. The
first, epiphenomenalism is the view that beliefs are not causally connected
to actions. With respect to evolution, on epiphenomenalism, beliefs are
invisible. What matters for natural selection is behaviour. If beliefs are not
part of the causal history of any action, they can in no way be selected for.
The second does not fare much better. If beliefs are caused by actions, then
they are downstream of evolution. Their truth or falsity have no bearing on
behaviour. According to the third, beliefs play a role in causing action, but
not by virtue of content. Plantinga illustrates with an example from Dretske.
If one reads a poem so loudly that the sounds break glass, the sounds have
meaningful content. But that content is not causally relevant to the glass
breaking. On each of these three possibilities, beliefs could not be selected
for their truth. Since the truth of a belief is causally irrelevant with respect
to action, they are invisible to natural selection. On the fourth possibility,
beliefs are similar, evolutionarily speaking, to sickle-cell anemia. The traits
are maladaptive, but connected to genes that code other behaviour that is
conducive to survival. The fifth possibility is the common sense view that
beliefs indeed cause behaviour and are adaptive.
Since these possibilities are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive,
P(R|N ∧ E) is just the weighted average:
P(R|N ∧ E) =
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 1)P(1|N ∧ E)+
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 2)P(2|N ∧ E)+
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 3)P(3|N ∧ E)+
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 4)P(4|N ∧ E)+
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 5)P(5|N ∧ E)
We may be able to simplify this a bit. It seems to me that the truth of
(N∧E) is not relevant to the question of which of these options holds. For our
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purposes, this would indicate that they are probabilistically independent.
If that is the case, we get:
P(R|N ∧ E) =
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 1)P(1)+
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 2)P(2)+
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 3)P(3)+
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 4)P(4)+
P(R|N ∧ E ∧ 5)P(5)
For the reasons mentioned above, Plantinga contends that P(R|N∧E∧1)
(that is, the likelihood of our cognitive faculties being reliable given the
conjunction of naturalism, evolution, and epiphenomenalism) is very low.
Similarly, for 2-4. However, P(R|N∧E∧5), he concedes might be “somewhat
greater than 1/2” (1993, p. 227).14 Why only “somewhat more than half”?
Here Plantinga relies on Stich’s (1990, p.62) observation that a rule like
“better safe than sorry” will enhance fitness while leading to many false
beliefs. Wilkins and Griffiths counter with the claim that truth-tracking is
“the means by which fitness is achieved” (2012, p.138). What Wilkins and
Griffiths overlook, however, is that truth-tracking is only half of the story
when it comes to the action-selection we are talking about when we discuss
biological fitness beyond phenotypic plasticity. Desires also play a role. As
Stephens notes, “One might think that for each combination of beliefs and
desires, there is a kind of mirror image where one has beliefs that deviate
from the true and desires that deviate from the good in such a way that these
are behaviourally equivalent” (2001, p.184). Stephens concedes that this
may be true if we consider particular action-belief combinations. However,
he identifies a range of conditions in which rule-based reasoning (such as
Stich’s “better safe than sorry” proposal) will select for rules that lead to
accurate beliefs and desires. So, it may be that Plantinga is being a little
pessimistic here. However, even if we take his assessment of “somewhat
more than half”, it will be sufficient to undermine his conclusion on a
14Later, he suggests that this probability might be “inscrutable”. I take it this claim presup-
poses some additional constraints on the priors than the view currently under consideration.
I discuss a prominent proposal for such a constraint a little later in this section.
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Bayesian interpretation.
We are now in a position to see why the subjective Bayesian view15 is
not sufficient for Plantinga’s argument. In short, it threatens to render his
Premise 1 inapplicable to a wide swath of his audience. Consider someone
whose prior distribution for 1-5 is that P(5) is very high, and that each
of P(1) − P(4) is vanishingly low. Since 5 is the common-sense position,
I take it that this distribution will accurately describe the distribution of
the majority of people who consider Plantinga’s argument. If we take
Plantinga’s estimates for the likelihoods, and weight those according to the
common-sense distribution, P(R|N ∧ E) will be “somewhat more than 0.5”.
This hardly seems low, certainly not low enough to generate a defeater
for R. Premise 1, then, is false for anyone whose prior probabilities are
as described in the preceding paragraph. Plantinga’s argument fails to
produce a defeater for anyone who holds N, E, and the common-sense
view with respect to the causal relation between belief and action.
So, the standard Bayesian account is too permissive, and further nor-
mative constraints on epistemic probabilities are needed. One constraint
Plantinga (2003, 2011) mentions in defending the EAAN is the Principle of
Indifference (PI). PI is a feature of classical treatments of probability, such
as those of Pascal, Fermat, and Laplace. It also features in more recent treat-
ments, such as Keynes’ “logical view” mentioned in footnote 3. According
to PI “if there is no known reason for predicating of our subject one rather
than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the
assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability” (Keynes,
1921, p.42). So, Plantinga might argue, since we have no reason to assign
higher probability to any of 1-5, we must assign them each 0.2. Indeed, as
we have seen, without PI, it is difficult to imagine any reason for excluding
the distribution that strongly favours the eminently plausible 5 over 1-4.
PI is contentious, generating a family of paradoxes, the Bertrand para-
doxes.16 In addition to these, I claim that Plantinga specifically has strong
reasons to refrain from endorsing PI. In what has come to be known as “Re-
15Note that this problem arises equally on Williamson’s (2000) objective Bayesian view
(sometimes labelled “epistemic probability”). On that view, prior probabilities are not
credences, but “a measure of intrinsic plausibility” (p.212). Whatever intrinsic plausibility
amounts to, it is hard for me to imagine that any of 1-4 are remotely close to as intrinsically
plausible as 5.
16For an overview of these paradoxes, and some strategies that have been put forward
for dealing with them, see Gillies (2000, p.37-49).
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formed Epistemology” (RE), Plantinga (1981, 2000) has famously argued
that belief in God can be “properly basic”. There are two components to
this claim. First, the language of basicality derives from a foundationalist
approach to epistemology. A basic belief serves as foundational for other
beliefs, but itself needs no other belief to serve as its foundation. Examples
of such a belief might be my belief that there is a tree in front of me. While
this belief derives from my visual experience of a tree in front of me, it is
not derived inferentially from more basic beliefs. Second, the language of
proper basicality is normative. A properly basic belief is a belief for which
it is (epistemically normatively) ok for one to hold non-inferentially. A key
part of Plantinga’s claim, then, is that belief is God is the sort of belief that
one can hold non-inferentially in an epistemically acceptable way.
I contend that this claim is at odds with Plantinga’s endorsement of PI.
In terms of epistemic probability, anyone who has a non-inferential belief
in God assigns a high prior probability to the proposition “God exists.”
Note that both basic beliefs and prior probabilities are non-inferential. The
prior probability of a proposition P is its probability considered apart from
evidence. This can only be done non-inferentially. Presumably, beliefs have
epistemic probabilities greater than 0.5.17 But, the highest probability the
PI will allow for any proposition is 0.5. To see why this is so, recall that
PI applies when one has no known reason for deciding among a set of
alternatives. The smallest set of alternatives has at least two members.
We are now in a position to see why RE is odds with PI. Suppose
someone has a properly basic belief that God exists. Since it is basic, it is
non-inferential. Since it is non-inferential, the person knows no reason to
decide between believing that God exists or not believing. Then, applying
PI, the person ought to assign a probability of no more than 0.5 to the
proposition that God exists. Now a dilemma: if they assign greater than
0.5, they believe, but not properly. If they assign less than 0.5, they do not
believe. In either case, they do not have a properly basic belief that God
exists, contradicting our initial supposition. So, the PI is incompatible with
the claim that belief in God can be properly basic.
We could make the point in the other direction. Consider the 5 possi-
bilities for how belief and action are causally connected. Could a naturalist
17This assumption is known as the “Lockean Thesis” in the literature on bridge principles
between full and partial belief.
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not accept the 5th option as a properly basic belief? It seems to me that
the answer is clearly yes. The 5th option has a lot in common with many
of the examples (beside belief in God) that Plantinga suggests are properly
basic beliefs: belief in other minds, belief in a world external to our minds.
These are highly intuitive, common sensical beliefs. So is the belief that our
beliefs cause actions that promote our survival. And so, any adherent in
RE should have no qualms allowing that belief to be properly basic as well.
To recap, then, objective probabilities are not suitable for Plantinga’s
argument insofar as they entail that TT is false. Permissive subjective
probabilities, like the Bayesian view, leave many of Plantinga’s interlocutors
unaffected by his claim. And PI, along with the more restrictive view of
epistemic probability it posits, is eliminated from the arsenal of adherents
of RE.
3 Going Forward with the EAAN
So, where does this leave the EAAN? In the space remaining, I will sketch
several ways forward for a defence of this argument available to defenders
of both RE and the EAAN.
First, they might be content to leave things here. The argument is still
powerful. It constrains the would-be naturalist to a common-sense view
about how beliefs hook up with actions. To be sure, a number of naturalist
philosophers do not endorse this common-sense view, and may still be
subject to the defeat problem alleged in the argument.
Second, they might develop a more nuanced version of PI. This theory
would prescribe more subtle criteria than Keynes’ for when the principle
applies. If they could develop a plausible version of the principle according
to which it did not apply to basic belief in God, but did apply to the question
of how beliefs hook up with action, the EAAN would be back in business.
Third, they might argue against an assumption I made in §2. I assumed
there that the values for the prior probabilities of the 5 possibilities of how
beliefs hook up with action are probabilistically independent with respect to
(N∧E). One might object that this incorrect. According to this objection, the
adherent of (N∧E) is committed to assigning a lower value to P(5|N∧E) than
to P(5). In order for that to be the case, they would need to be committed
to assigning a higher probability P(n|N ∧ E) than to P(n), for at least one of
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1-4. It is difficult to see why this would be so. Consider epiphenomenalism.
Most naturalists, I take it, are physicalists with respect to the mental. The
claim that dualism entails epiphenomenalism has often been used as an
argument by physicalists against dualism. Physicalism seems to be the
default view for naturalists in philosophy of mind. So, it does not seem
like the naturalism commits someone to 1 more than non-naturalism does.
Or consider 3. Plantinga considers this to be part of the computational
theory of mind. However, it seems there are plenty of variants of the
computational theory of mind that subscribe to 5 rather than 318, so that
seems an overstatement. I can’t think of any reason to suppose that 2 and
4 should be more probable given (N ∧ E). At any rate, it is hard to see
what about (N ∧ E) would commit someone to assigning a lower value to
P(5|N ∧ E) than to P(5). It seems to me that the prospects for an argument
against this assumption are dim. If successful, however, such an argument
would show that the naturalist’s commitments force them to assign higher
probability to one or more of the 4 problematic views. The result would be
that the naturalist’s commitments would force them to accept Premise 1.
Fourth, they might further develop Plantinga’s (2011, p.348-350) sug-
gestion of a version of the EAAN that reduces the scope of the argument.
Note that the original EAAN makes a claim about all of our cognitive fac-
ulties. That is, it casts suspicion on all of our belief-forming mechanisms,
given (N ∧ E). However, a more fine-grained approach might identify fac-
ulties that are more likely to be reliable, given (N ∧ E), and some that are
less likely. Plantinga suggests that the faculty that produces metaphysical
beliefs is among the latter. This seems plausible. Consider the metaphysical
dispute between persistence and perdurance theories. On the former ob-
jects are 3-dimensional, persisting through time, and are wholly present at
each moment they exist. On the latter, objects are 4-dimensional, extended
through time just as they are through space, and at each moment only a slice
of them exists. When encountering a tiger, this question has no relevance
with respect to biological fitness. Fitness only requires recognizing that I
need to put distance between myself and the object before me. Getting that
correct will enhance my fitness, regardless of whether I am wrong with re-
spect to the question of whether the object is a persistent one or a perdurant
18See (Rescorla, 2020) for a taxonomy of the variations of the computational theory of
mind
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one. A promising line of inquiry here would be Stephens’(2001) “sand-
wiching” argument. On this account, some propositions are such that there
is selective pressure in two directions: both against being too gullible and
against being too skeptical with respect to that proposition. An example of
such a proposition is whether some patch of mushrooms is safe to eat. If
the organism is too skeptical, they miss out on nutritional opportunities. If
the organism is too gullible, they ingest poison. Metaphysical propositions
would seem to lack the material consequences needed for this type of sand-
wiching of selective pressures. If this approach is correct, then naturalism
(as a metaphysical position) would still be subject to the defeat problem
described in the EAAN.
A fifth option to consider is whether the EAAN needs to reference prob-
abilities at all. It seems like premise 1 could be expressed as a subjunctive
conditional instead. Perhaps something like, “If it were the case that (N∧E)
were true, then it would be the case that our cognitive faculties are unreli-
able”. For this claim to be expressed in a way consistent with TT, adherents
of TT would need to consider it as a counterpossible conditional. But
that should not be a problem for Plantinga. After all, he argues, “Philoso-
phers regularly and quite properly use counterpossibles in arguing for their
views” (2011, p.338). Perhaps the EAAN should be one of those arguments.
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